Feminist scholars have been producing research and theoretical reflections on women, gender, and global transformations at least since 1970, the date of publication of Ester Boserup's ground-breaking Woman's Role in Economic Development. In this essay, I discuss some aspects of the mostly Western feminist scholarship on gender and globalization to provide a context for the papers in this volume. Although I do not attempt to summarize what is now a very large literature, 1 I briefly look at how gender is implicated in globalization processes, asking whether and how these processes are gendered and what gendered effects result from these processes.
4 A Historical/Methodological note: I have the sense that the term "globalization" began to be used as the dominance of neo-liberal capitalism began to be proclaimed in the late 1980s and certainly by the time of the demise of the USSR and communist regimes in other countries around 1989-90. At that time political leaders in the Northern, rich capitalist countries began to proclaim triumphantly, "There Is No Alternative" to their form of capitalism. Until then, one could have argued that there were two competing global systems, but with only one remaining, TINA seemed obvious. "Globalization" as an area of research and publication exploded once there seemed to be only one global playing field. A bibliographical search for articles on globalization confirms this surmise. Academic Search Elite lists 5 articles on globalization for the ten years from January 1978 to January 1988 . From February 1988 to December 1995 , 52 articles with this subject appear, while in the seven-year period from January 1996 to December 2002, 2,287 articles on globalization were indexed.
huge. With the destruction of the socialist economies and the beginning of their transformation into capitalist economies linked into the capitalist world system, another arena of change affected by globalization emerged. The problems women face in these transforming societies are different in many ways from those in the rich capitalist nations or in the so-called developing nations. A distinct research area is emerging around gender and change in the former socialist countries and in countries such as Cuba and China which are still formally socialist, but in the process of entering the global capitalist world (True 2000) . These broad categorizations, rich capitalist, developing, and ex-socialist nations, represent different pre-existing social/economic arrangements, the conditions which shape the ways in which different groups of people are incorporated in global processes, and conditions which globalizing capitalist organizations both use and contend with. These categories are much too broad, however, for within them exist great variations based on class, gender, race, politics, culture, and local and national histories. While adequate comprehension of globalizing changes must be based on knowledge of local and concrete situations, categorical boundaries can inhibit truly global understandings that emphasize linkages and interdependencies. Other discursive boundaries have posed methodological issues for feminist scholars of globalization. These are boundaries between the local/global, the micro/macro, and the ethnographical/structural. Freeman (2001) argues that local studies of globalization processes and effects are associated with the female as researcher and object of research, while global macro-analyses are associated with the male, again as researcher and object of research. These binaries contain and reproduce a gendered hierarchy of power with political as well as methodological implications.
5 Methodologically, to understand global transformations, connections must be established between the local and global or the binaries themselves must be deconstructed. Connell (2000) suggests one strategy, also discussed by Gibson-Graham (2002) , which is to conceptualize the local as an ethnographic moment embedded in ongoing, complex processes linking the moment into webs of relations extending into global processes. Thus, the ethnographic moment provides an entry into these processes. 6 This approach also implies that the local exists within the global; local sites exist within the locations of global power, in corporate headquarters or in the World Bank, for example. To understand globalization we need accounts of the practices and processes in these places. Looking at globalizing, transnational organizations and the actions of their CEOs and other top managers may result in more clarity about what is happening than looking at macro structures and processes as unattached to bodies and identities.
Is Globalization Gendered?
"Is globalization gendered?" could be answered in many ways. I have chosen to first look at how gender is embedded in the structuring and ongoing practices of globalizing capitalism, and to second, examine the impacts of some of the changes linked to globalization on women, men, families, and gender relations.
Gender as embedded in globalizing capitalism.
I argue that gender is intrinsic to globalizing capitalist processes and relations by 5 See Gibson-Graham (2002) for a much more elaborated discussion of this issue.
6 This approach has some similarities to Dorothy Smith's (1987 Smith's ( , 1999 contributions to developing a feminist sociology in which she argues for taking standpoints within the local situations of particular oppressed women and men in order to identify and map the relations of ruling in which they are embedded and which produce both their situations of subordination and their opposition to those situations.
been subordinate in both domains, held responsible for unpaid reproductive labor and consigned to positions with less power and lower pay than men within the sphere of production. Men, unburdened by reproduction responsibilities and already the major wielders of power, built the factories and railroads, and managed the developing capitalist enterprises. Thus, the structural and ideological division between production and reproduction was shaped along lines of gender and contributed to continuing gendered inequalities. This division emerged in the historical development of Euro-American capitalism, and contributed to a particular cultural/structural form of masculine dominance that was exported in the early phases of globalization. 8 North Atlantic masculinities were not, however, simply transferred to diverse colonial worlds, as Mohanty (2002) and others point out. In some colonizing efforts, colonized men were "feminized" by European occupiers as weak and compliant, not sufficiently masculine. dominance through colonization, empire, and today's globalization, one of the cultural/structural forms embedded in that dominance has been the identification of the male/masculine with production in the money economy and the identification of the female/feminine with reproduction and the domestic. This ideological construction starkly contrasts with the actual organization of production and reproduction, as women were often as much "producers" as "reproducers."
The gender-coded separation between production and reproduction became, over time, an underlying principle in the conceptual and actual physical organization of work, the spatial and time relationships between unpaid domestic and paid work, bodily movements through time and space, the general organization of daily life, and the ways that groups and individuals constructed meaning and identities. For example, the rules and expectations of ordinary capitalist workplaces are built on hidden assumptions about a separation of production and reproduction (Acker 1990 ).
This gendered organization of social life provides the grounds for the reproduction of different and unequal lives of women and men, and for the reproduction of images and ideologies that support difference and inequality, long after the ideals and actualities of separate spheres for some have been weakened or, in some cases, have disappeared altogether. Gender was and is thus built into the organization of daily life, but not in the same ways or with the same consequences for everyone. Class and race/ethnic differences, embedded in different histories, mediate the gendered organization of daily life and identity and the gendered deployment of power in the Euro-American capitalist centers and in other countries and areas brought into their orbit through conquest, settlement, colonization, empire, and today's 'globalization.'
9
The contradictory goals of production and reproduction contribute to another gendered aspect of globalizing capitalist processes. This is the frequent corporate practice, on national and global levels, of claiming non-responsibility for reproduction of human life and reproduction of the natural environment. Here I find it useful to use Diane Elson's (1994) description in economic terms of the separation between production and reproduction as a division between the monetary "productive" economy and the non-monetary "reproductive" economy. 10 "The ability 9 A large literature on these processes now exists. See, for example Mies 1986; Mohanty, Russo, and Torres 1991; Connell 2000. 10 The idea of a 'productive' and a 'reproductive' economy in uneasy interdependence is in some ways similar to the much earlier Marxist feminist argument that housework was necessary to the 9 of money to mobilize labour power for 'productive work' depends on the operation of some non- representing the interests and perspectives of production, implicitly assumes that "there is an unlimited supply of unpaid female labour, able to compensate for any adverse changes resulting from macro-economic policy, so as to continue to meet the basic needs of their families and communities and sustain them as social organizations." (Elson 1994, 42) Although the monetary and non-monetary economies are interdependent, their interests are also often contradictory and conflicting: maximizing profit and capital accumulation may undermine the reproduction and maintenance of human life, given that an adequate labor supply still exists. At the very least, capitalist expansion has often involved the subordination of the aims of reproduction to the aims of production, either through explicit policies and practices or through un-benign neglect or non-responsibility. I think it is very important to see nonresponsibility as actively constructed through organizational inventions and state actions, such as legislation in the 19th and 20th centuries that created the rights of corporations to act in their own interests, as their leaders defined those interests.
The establishment in the 19th Century of laissez-faire ideology with rational economic man as the iconic figure supported denial of responsibility by economic organizations. Rational economic man acted purposively in his own interest, his decisions contributing to positive reproduction of labor power and thus necessary to the production of surplus value. This argument disappeared partly because of its functional nature -i.e. housework exists because it is necessary or functional for capital. The notion of productive and reproductive economies seems not to have this problem of circularity. However, this formulation is an oversimplified abstraction that does not provide space for the increasing role of the state in both production and reproduction in the history of capitalism in Euro-American countries.
outcomes for the community and nation. 11 The needs of reproduction, to the extent that they were visible, would be provided for by positive economic outcomes. This did not happen automatically: the history of Anglo-American capitalism can be read as a series of ongoing battles between workers and employers over issues related to reproduction such as the payment of starvation wages, the refusal to provide safe working conditions, insistence on long working hours, or the destruction of environments and indigenous communities. Under some conditions, capitalist firms did take some (paternal) responsibility for workers, families, and communities, as exemplified by company towns founded in the US. This usually occurred when the firm was well established in a particular place and dependent on a local labor supply. However, historically, men in control of the monetary economy, the sphere of production, have often denied that they or their firms have any responsibility for reproduction. The human needs of colonized peoples were also of no concern, as their non-monetized economies were routinely weakened or destroyed in the processes of empire and later globalization.
Capitalist organizations continued to ignore the needs of their own workers and their families and people in general unless forced to pay attention, either because a critical need arose for certain labor power or because social movements, responding to crises of reproduction as in the 1930s, either directly or through state intervention challenged corporate power (Acker 1988 ).
The development of welfare states after World War II, especially in the rich Northern countries, diluted this power by establishing state supports for reproduction and forcing firms to also take some responsibility. Although outcomes varied, welfare states were usually based on the assumption that women still provide the unpaid work of caring. In the same period in the U.S., under pressures of the labor movement, large corporations negotiated higher wages, medical care, vacations and other benefits with their workers, even as they may have still opposed national and state legislation for welfare programs.
Subsequent history abounds with corporate efforts to protect and restore nonresponsibility, with considerable success in the 1990s. The restoration of neo-liberalism as the dominating economic discourse has provided legitimacy for reducing welfare state programs and restoring corporate non-responsibility in most countries, although this varies greatly. At the same 11 See Lourdes Benería (1999) for another analysis focusing on the development of market society.
time, some parts of reproductive services move into the capitalist economy, becoming available only to those able to pay. In the U.S., from opposition to worker efforts to raise wages to refusals to support paid parental leave legislation or public day care, corporations escalate their denial of responsibility for anything but the bottom line. Caring and nurturing, unless a source of profit,
are not important, in spite of rhetoric to the contrary. ("Leave no child behind" is a cynical and dishonest goal in this context.) As caring work is devalued, so are those who primarily do that work. Claims to non-responsibility reinforce the underlying gender divisions between production and reproduction and the gendered understructure of capitalist production, as they continually relegate reproduction to the unpaid work of women or to the low paid work of women in the forprofit economy.
These gendered elements in fundamental capitalist processes are exacerbated in present globalizing changes. "Development" in Third World countries often, perhaps usually, disrupts the reproduction of daily life through the non-monetary economy as peasant agriculture continues to be displaced by corporate farming, cheap agricultural imports, or deforestation. conditions. The transnational organization of production builds non-responsibility into the structure of capitalist processes. As corporations such as Nike or Liz Claiborne contract production to firms in other countries, the corporation has relatively few workers of its own, thus few who might demand responsibility. As Applebaum and Gereffi (1990,44) say, "Contracting means that the so-called manufacturer need not employ any production workers, run the risk of unionization or wages pressures, or be concerned with layoffs resulting from changes in product demands." Thus, downloading responsibility in the interest of accumulation underlies corporate decisions to continually move production to the location with the cheapest labor. Nonresponsibility is built into globalizing processes, indeed the opportunities for production and gain without challenges to non-responsibility probably constitute a major incentive for moving production from rich, capitalist countries to poorer, low wage locations. At the same time, back in corporate headquarters in the U.S. or other rich countries, where design, marketing, and production decisions are made, a significant degree of gender and race/ethnic equality may emerge as skilled professionals are hired to do this work. It may even be good business for Nike, Globalizing masculinities organized around violence and domination seems to have been 12 Much of this discussion is based on the work of R.W. Connell (1987 Connell ( , 2000 . Connell (1998) describes a 'trans-national business masculinity' as "marked by increasing egocentrism, very conditional loyalties (even to the corporation), and a declining sense of responsibility for others (except for purposes of image making)." (p. 16) This masculinity also seems marked by arrogance, a passion to control, ruthlessness, and aggression. I suspect that excitement and pleasure, perhaps bordering on the erotic (Hacker 1989) , are also part of this hegemonic masculinity, including the intertwined pleasures of technology and power. We may have failed to take adequate notice of pleasures as we have considered the role that emotions and gender identities play in organizations, and by extension in the globalizing processes of capitalism. Arlie Hochshild's (1997) description of the pleasures of being at work, pleasures that make the workplace a more desirable place to be than the home, is an exception. Pleasure may extend to domination (Hearn 1993) . To dominate may produce a rush of exhilaration. Sally
Hacker argued that the pleasures of technology often become "harnessed to domination, and passion becomes directed toward power over nature, the machine, and other people, particularly women, in the work hierarchy" (Acker 1990, p. 153) .
Transnational business masculinity, although it may involve the pleasures of domination, does not need to be openly violent because the means of violence are institutionalized in seemingly neutral, rational business practices (Hearn and Parkin 2002) . The violence of leaving people without resources for survival through downsizing or moving production from one lowwage locale to another lower-wage locale is simply business necessity. Conceptualized through accounting and strategic planning, no human bodies appear on the books, thus such violences are accomplished as gender neutral and abstracted from actual human consequences. This is another way that corporate non-responsibility and its gendered consequences are embedded in ordinary practices.
Will men and various forms of hegemonic masculinity continue to dominate and symbolize the organizations leading and profiting from globalization? Women, at least a few, are represented among business and political leaders, but they are rare and usually must perform in terms of prescriptions gendered as masculine. However, there are indications that the "new economy," is emerging in a form as male-dominated as the "old economy." The new dominant growth sectors, information technology, biotech innovation, and global finance, are all heavily male-dominated, although women fill some of the jobs in the middle and at the bottom, as is usual in many old economy sectors. Numerically these are small sectors, but their importance far outdistances their size. Much of the evidence for the male dominance of these sectors is anecdotal and comes from the press, from novels, and from TV images. There is, however, some systematic data on gender in computer science and computer technology, occupations that are fundamental to the new economy sectors; without computers these sectors would not exist.
In the U.S., women are a decreasing proportion of those being educated in computer science as well as a decreasing proportion of those working as computer scientists and analysts. Apparently, little has changed. In addition, computer science emerged in close connection to engineering, which has always been a male-identified and dominated field. Although as this is written in 2003, the IT and computer industry is in a deep recession, there are no indications that this technology will become less important for globalizing transnational firms.
Male dominance and a masculine ethos of computer science have an importance that goes beyond the new economy sectors and extends to the global society as a whole. As many have pointed out, the 'old economy' of material production is becoming as dependent on computer technology as is the new economy of information production. According to press reports, computerization of production, marketing, and distribution continues at a rapid pace in spite of the present downturn in the dot.com world. Moreover, old economy firms may in the future become dominated by computer experts (IT experts) as well as highly dependent on the technology itself. An article in the International Herald Tribune (June 20, 2000) predicted that
Britain's large multinational firms will increasingly recruit top managers from among Information Technology managers. The article also noted that among 3,500 IT managers in Britain, identified by an association of IT managers, only three were women. Perhaps future CEOs will come from this group. If so, women will be as under-represented as ever.
Computer scientists and technologists may not be the Information Technology managers of the future. Instead, they may be people trained in business administration, but with a broad grasp of technology issues, which might mean that more women could move into such positions.
However, the gendered expectations and behaviors of top corporate leaders seem to continue to be defined in terms set by hegemonic masculinities even when women fill these positions, as noted above. Gendered images and ideologies of femininity and masculinity are used in various sectors of international capital to construct desirable workers (and managers) and desired behaviors, Working class and Third World women are often seen as docile, cheap to employ, and able to endure boring, repetitive work, whether or not women see themselves in these ways. The "feminization of labor" (Standing 1989) , or the increasing insecurity, low pay, and routine tasks of jobs and other forms of employment, confirms such images of women workers.
Gender as a Resource for Globalizing
In the rich 'developed' countries, gender images continue to help shape sex segregation, the continuing gender stereotyping of jobs, and the symbolic construction of desirable workers.
Images of successful professionals and managers in global businesses are sexualized and gendered as they are presented in the media. These images are not uniform, but seem to present a variety of ways in which to be assertive, smart, competitive, and in control. Some of these images are depictions of feminine success, the young and sexy woman who is beautiful as well as on top in the business world. Such images suggest the changing class configurations of gender in the centers of capitalist global power. Changing gender images seem to have also been part of the transitions from socialism to market capitalism in Eastern Europe. For example, the image of the male worker as the hero of socialism has been replaced by the entrepreneur (True 2000) .
The Gendered Effects of Globalization
Globalization has had gendered impacts on the lives of women, men, and their families.
The following is a very brief summary of some of these effects. One of the most visible impacts has been the increased participation of women in the paid labor market almost everywhere, except in the former socialist countries, while for men labor market participation has decreased (Standing 1999) . At the same time, Standing (1999) and others argue, the old full-time, secure, with-benefits kind of employment is eroding as new "feminized" jobs, low-paid, temporary or part-time, insecure, and without benefits are created. However, these new jobs are often much better than no jobs and they do improve the lives of many of the women who have them. In addition, in many countries educated middle-class women have had in the 1980s and 1990s increased opportunities for professional and managerial employment, contributing to increased affluence for their families, while exacerbating class differences among women. Another general impact is that unemployment has also risen around the globe (Standing 1999), with some indications that men's unemployment rates are rising to the levels of those of women. Although need seems to be rising globally, the old welfare state systems of redistribution have been weakened in many countries, and transnational systems of distribution through NGOs cannot meet this increased need. While weakened, the welfare states in Europe still provide many protections and services that mitigate the effects of economic restructuring. In contrast, the devolution of the welfare state is most extreme in the U.S. where welfare state supports were already weak. For example, single mothers on welfare are forced to enter paid work, whatever the costs to their children and themselves (Acker, Morgen, and Gonzales 2002) . The ideology of neo-liberal economics, so central in globalization, has become the basis for a welfare program aiming to enforce universal labor market participation.
Generalization about the effects of changes in the structure of employment and welfare state protections is difficult and problematic because they vary tremendously over time, over nations, over economic sectors, and over class and race/ethnic as well as gender lines. However, it seems that women may be more negatively affected than men.
Global changes also affect personal gender relations and identities. For some women, increased opportunity for paid employment may mean greater autonomy and equality in personal life, or avenues out of oppressive relationships. For others, these changes lead to less security, greater difficulties in taking care of themselves and their families, and, perhaps, the necessity to remain in unsupportive or violent relationships with men. The old Euro-American gender contract in which men earned the family income and women did the unpaid work of maintaining home and family is substantially gone, although still an ideal for many. To the extent that a secure job and a living wage were supports for a stable masculinity, that masculinity may be threatened by the increasing difficulty in finding such work, as men are extruded from good jobs into less skilled jobs, unemployment, or early retirement. This is probably a particularly severe problem for young men who are trying to establish a satisfactory masculine identity. These examples only touch on a few of the possible consequences of global restructuring for the destabilizing of gender identities.
Some things remain the same. In spite of the erosion of the economic base for the old solutions.
male/provider -female/carer model in the rich industrial countries of the North, work has been and still is organized on a masculine model of the worker. This model has a fundamental lack of fit with the more complex demands for nurturing and earning money of most women's lives.
This model for work organization is predicated upon the separation of production from other aspects of life, as I argued above. The reorganization of work and demands for increased productivity, increased intensity of work, and longer or irregular hours, increase the lack of fit with women's lives (Hochschild 1997 ) and the lives of men who desire to share family work.
(Few men are as yet required to share this work.) These increasing demands stretch across levels of skill and hierarchy, although varying in terms of specific pressures. In the lowest paid femaletyped service jobs, such as elder or child care, serving in fast food restaurants, or routine clerical jobs, work invades life through irregular schedules, required overtime and/or required part-time.
Thus, increased stress for many workers, especially women, is another consequence of the complex changes that are summarized under the concept "globalization."
Conclusion
The papers in this volume show how women's labor is a resource for global capital, how images and ideologies of femininity are used to construct desirable workers and services, and how the penetration of global capital has diverse effects on the lives of women workers and their families. The non-responsibility of transnational corporations is starkly illustrated in the article about Bangladesh by Kathryn Ward and her colleagues. In this impoverished country, women's multiple strategies of survival include working in garment factories that serve the global economy. Precarious subsistence strategies are threatened when jobs disappear as orders from
Europe and the U.S. decline because of changes in the management of the global economy.
The impacts of change in the former socialist countries are different, but complex and highly variable. Restructuring of these societies has often led to high unemployment among both women and men, but persistently high unemployment among women. Entry into the world of global capitalism has also meant a restoration or strengthening of traditional, capitalist gender, race, and class hierarchies.
The use of women as a labor resource and gendered images as justifications and guides in constructing that labor force is a complex process, as Leslie Salzinger shows in the case of export-processing on Mexico's northern border. The image of the perfect routine assembly worker, the docile and cheap young woman, does not always accord with the gender composition of the labor force. Salzinger shows how tenaciously managers of the Mexican plants held on to these images, even as the women workers began to show that they were not docile and would seek higher pay when they could, and as managers began to hire more and more men although men were seen as difficult and not docile.
Cecilia Ng raises challenging questions in her commentary. She suggests, for example, that studies are needed of the links and interrelationships that construct the developing countries as the "other" to the wealthy capitalist nations. Each of the other papers in this volume are studies located in only one country. However, each also contains hints about these links, such as the case of Bangladesh in which women workers are extremely vulnerable to the corporate decisions of U.S. managers. Ng also questions the concept of globalization. Is it an empty term?
Is it another "political-economic project" originating in the developed world, mystifying processes of control and subordination in and of the developing world? Perhaps feminist researchers should examine critically our use of "globalization." Is the popularity of the idea a product of, or a reaction to, the neo-liberal economic triumphalism of the end of the 1990s?
Should we reassess its value now that economic prospects are not reassuring in most countries and the stability of globalizing economic regimes seem in jeopardy as a consequence of war?
